

Source: Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Karl Kaiser (Eds.), *Germany's New Foreign Policy. Decision-Making in an Interdependent World*, Palgrave.

## Chapter 19

### Precarious Power: Germany at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century

Gunther Hellmann

The concept of 'power' has once again become central to the discussion about Germany's foreign policy. At issue is Germany as a power and Germany's power. The various definitions are just as multifaceted as the questions they raise and the contexts in which they are used (or not used). 'Power' is increasingly used in expressions which attempt to distill the Federal Republic's changed foreign-policy role to a single concept: Germany as a 'reluctant power', as the 'central power in Europe', as the 'leading European power', as a 'global economic power', as a permanently reformed 'civilian power' or as a re-emerging 'military power'.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the concept of 'power' is always present when 'politics of responsibility' specific to the Federal Republic, is opposed to 'power politics' practised by Germany in former times and still evident in the activities of other major countries.<sup>2</sup> Questions raised in all these contexts frequently concern the magnitudes of power. They centre on how powerful united Germany may be and whether Germany's power has increased or remained the same in the wake of 1989 and unification. That very few wonder whether Germany's power has diminished is an indication of the general answer a majority of foreign observers and Germans themselves would offer.<sup>3</sup>

However, these questions are not central to the present analysis, which is not to imply that they are unimportant. Quite the opposite is true since the view – widely

held outside Germany – that the country is now more powerful as a result of 1989-90 has serious political consequences.<sup>4</sup> However, to offer another voice to a debate which in general appeals to individual preferences and to arguments which are frequently polemical would not be particularly helpful. It is perhaps more useful to examine Germany's power from another angle, attempting to describe it at the beginning of the twenty-first century.<sup>5</sup> This can only offer a snapshot of the moment. Although the elements under study in an analysis of power such as the present one do not change daily in any perceptible or describable way, power is nevertheless subject to continual change.

### Key Concepts

'Power' is defined here as an actor's ability to achieve certain objectives which may be in conflict with those of other actors. There are three elements to this definition. Firstly, in a very basic sense, the actor must be attempting to maintain or create a desired condition. Secondly, his activity occurs within the context of social interactions with other actors who are pursuing their own objectives. Finally, whether these objectives are achievable depends on the availability of certain resources and skills.<sup>6</sup>

Two considerations are of central importance to this definition of power. Firstly, the objectives pursued by an actor stem from specific social situations which the actor considers unsatisfactory. Secondly, the process of problem identification and setting of objectives cannot be decoupled from the resources at the actor's disposal. Both affect each other reciprocally. Actors set objectives by constantly referring to their perceptions of problems, to perceptions and objectives of other actors as well as to

available resources. The availability of resources is every bit as variable as how problems are perceived and objectives are set.

This is why any description of ‘German power’ must bear in mind the reciprocal relationship between defined problems, objectives and resources. A recent book series of the German Council on Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik: DGAP) has discussed in great detail the most important problems (or ‘challenges’) and objectives (or ‘interests’) as perceived from a German standpoint,<sup>7</sup> while the present volume is primarily concerned with institutional aspects related to available resources. The following observations should, therefore, be understood as an attempt to bring together these findings and systematically apply them to an analysis of German power. A first step will compare German concerns (perceptions of problems) and objectives with those of other important actors, in an effort to identify the extent of compatibility. A second step will consider which resources are at the Federal Republic’s disposal for attaining its objectives. Only by drawing these connections will it be possible to properly assess German power, i.e. its ability to realize its objectives.<sup>8</sup>

One more remark about the actor concept used here: any discussion of ‘Germany’s’ ability to realize its objectives does not mean to imply that all Germans share the same foreign-policy concerns, nor does it deny that – in addition to those federal authorities charged by Article 32 of the Basic Law with conducting foreign relations – there are many other individuals and societal groups engaged in the business of foreign policy.<sup>9</sup> ‘Germany’ or ‘Federal Republic’ is used as a short formula – oversimplified for reasons of space – of societal actors and interests which, depending on the issue, can be very different. Given the constitutional division of competences and the concentration of foreign-policy expertise within the executive,

it is hardly surprising that the Federal Government is a key element.<sup>10</sup> Yet it would be a mistake to reduce 'German' interests to those harboured by the Federal Government, since government activity must always be seen in the context of public legitimacy and domestic resources.

The following sections will address those foreign-policy problems which either are particularly pressing from a specifically German standpoint or seem especially typical from a global perspective. This should provide the most effective way to gain an understanding of the various concerns of a country like the Federal Republic at the end of the twentieth century. Considering the domestic and international discourse over pressing foreign-policy and international challenges, two areas are most suited to providing an overview of Germany's power: (a) policy towards Eastern and Western Europe and (b) the ability of foreign policy to shape events in some of the most important global challenges at present.

#### Stabilizing Germany's Regional Environment

Within the domestic debate there is widespread consensus that stability of the immediate regional environment is the central challenge of German foreign policy.<sup>11</sup> Germany's Eastern neighbours have become a new field of activity, providing opportunities to shape events as well as need for action. There is also general agreement that these opportunities can only be realized within the context and with the assistance of existing, principally 'Western', institutions. However, since these institutions were conceived and developed under different historical conditions, fundamental adjustments are necessary to ensure their capabilities in the face of wider membership. Consequently, any attempt to stabilize Germany's regional environment in the East presupposes institutional reforms in the West.

### Integrating Germany's Eastern Neighbours and Enhancing Links With Russia

The Federal Republic regards the enlargement of NATO and the European Union (EU) while linking Russia to Western institutions through the NATO-Russia Council and the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the European Communities as a considerable success, which corresponds largely to German objectives, as set in the years following unification. For Germany, the main challenge here was to prevent the creation of a free-floating, 'intermediate Europe' on its Eastern frontier while at the same time assuaging Russian anxieties about being excluded and dispelling Western fears that Germany would try to gain supremacy in Central Europe and exploit this position at the expense of others.

The Federal Republic was largely successful in this, principally because there was a gradual convergence of German descriptions of problems and objectives with those of other important actors. The Federal Government was successful in using non-material and material resources of power in such a way that initial reservations or even opposition to German preferences were abandoned or at least diluted over time. Three non-material resources of power were important here. Probably the most important non-material power resource which Germany was able to use to overcome Russian opposition to NATO enlargement was the relationship of trust fostered with Moscow over the course of three decades. Despite being regarded as the staunchest proponent of unwelcome NATO enlargement, the Federal Republic is still seen as a reliable partner, even as an 'advocate of Russian interests' vis-à-vis the rest of the West and Western institutions.<sup>12</sup> It is one of the most important achievements of German foreign policy since unification that the relationship of trust with Russia has

been maintained or even strengthened without harming relations with Western partners.

Another important non-material power resource of considerable value to German foreign policy in this regard can be found in its instinctive preference for multilateralism.<sup>13</sup> This allows for a pragmatic orientation towards the larger centres of power while keeping the interests of smaller countries in mind.<sup>14</sup> In developing policy initiatives, the Federal Republic has developed a long-standing practice of first sounding out important partners rather than launching initiatives without consultation in hopes of gaining international prestige. Not only does this practice build confidence between Germany and its partners, it also makes it possible to retreat from initiatives without losing face. In the case of NATO expansion, the German minister of defence may have been the first to go public with specific demands, but negotiations that followed within NATO were nevertheless characterized by close co-operation between Bonn and Washington. Here, the Federal Government – at least ostensibly – left the initiative to the Americans.<sup>15</sup>

A third important non-material resource is the strong support or at least acquiescence among the political parties for Germany's policy towards Eastern Europe. Admittedly, there have been certain points of contention within the foreign-policy elite on the issue of NATO enlargement.<sup>16</sup> Yet, compared to debates on rearmament in the 1950s and on *Ostpolitik* in the early 1970s, there is considerable agreement regarding the objective of including the Eastern neighbours and enhancing links with Russia.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the general public expressed no clear preferences on these issues, tending to display a diffuse public mood along broad party lines.<sup>18</sup>

As important as these three non-material resources are, it is nevertheless true that they are precarious. Public consensus proved to be relatively firm during the war in

Kosovo. Yet debates on the left, in general, and among the Greens, in particular, as well as fundamental differences between attitudes in West and East Germany, showed that other political constellations could easily lead to splits in public opinion. Given previous experience (as with the Gulf War), there are doubts about whether the public consensus here would have stood firm in the face of mounting crises in Eastern Europe or if there were serious discussion of German troops having to defend a threatened new NATO ally in Eastern Europe.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, trust between countries can dissipate quickly. A few blunders can whittle it away, particularly since the burden of German history has seemingly still not been paid off. Emotionally-charged phrases like ‘Germany’s special path’ (*Sonderweg*), ‘Germany’s drive to become a great power’ (*Großmachtstreben*) and ‘typically German’ are still reference points for judging German foreign policy and hence for how other countries view German objectives.<sup>20</sup> In this context, the mere possibility that the Federal Republic could loosen its Western ties and (once again) go it alone must be regarded as a power resource of sorts.<sup>21</sup> Yet all previous experience indicates that this ‘resource’ could quickly lose its value and, indeed, become a new burden if this possibility were to become reality. Germany’s foreign-policy reputation feeds today on the perception of the Federal Republic as a reliable partner continuing to advocate multilateralism. Moreover, it is becoming more important as a resource, given that it remains in sharp contrast to those historical experiences with German foreign policy before 1945 which most of the Federal Republic’s partners still keep in the back of their minds.<sup>22</sup>

The analysis thus far has concentrated on the great extent to which success or failure of German attempts to stabilize its regional environment in Eastern Europe is dependent on non-material resources. Yet trust cannot be built up by words alone and

an instinct for multilateralism in itself does not create opportunities for influence, as a brief look at Luxembourg shows. Non-material resources of power must be backed up by material ones. In this respect, too, German foreign policy potentially has considerable weight in influencing its East European neighbours and its partners in the West. Firstly, the Federal Republic's military potential, although purely conventional, is considerable, despite financial cutbacks in recent years. Admittedly, it would be difficult for the Russians to regard it as menacing, unless, of course, the Federal Republic were seen to have the worst intentions. Yet such fears would be unfounded, not only because any German military aggression would come up against considerable constitutional problems and domestic opposition but also because the Bundeswehr remains closely integrated in the mutual control mechanisms of NATO. In this respect, one of the potentially most important sources of international mistrust has lost nearly all significance in dealing with Germany's neighbours. At the same time, however, this has clearly enhanced trust and influence within NATO – as experience with Bundeswehr presence in the Balkans has shown. Secondly, experience in recent years has demonstrated that German economic involvement in Eastern Europe has had more positive than negative effects. Both Eastern and Western Europe have expressed fears that the Federal Republic could use its unchallenged position as leading financial backer, trading partner and investor in Eastern Europe to become an economic hegemon. These fears cannot be substantiated, neither statistically nor by pointing to German behaviour.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, it is generally recognized that Germany's economic potential is an important power resource. Although the Federal Republic can hardly put it to use in pursuing specific objectives, it does undeniably play a significant role when countries decide to adopt an open and co-operative foreign policy towards Germany.



However, despite all the asymmetries emerging from an analysis of economic data, it cannot be ignored that economic dependencies, in particular, are always mutual and hence offer both parties forms of influence – whether such influence manifests itself merely as a refusal to co-operate or as a threat of chaos.

In sum, the Federal Republic certainly holds one of the keys to East European stability. Here, it is to Germany's advantage that its perceptions of problems are not only broadly shared by its partners but also that the proposed solutions have been developed jointly between Germany and its partners. In addition, it is characteristic of the way in which the problem of impending instability is defined and possible suggestions for creating greater stability through integration and enhanced links are discussed, that not even a comparatively powerful country such as Germany can do much on its own. Although the Federal Republic can – at least in the eyes of others – influence developments in Eastern Europe more strongly than ever before over the last fifty years, given its location, its economic potential, its role as a 'co-leading power' (*Mitführungsmacht*) in the EU and in NATO<sup>24</sup> and not least due to its highly ambivalent recent history, even such a key player essentially remains dependent on multilateral co-ordination.

#### Reforming 'Western' Institutions

Stabilizing the Eastern neighbours requires changes in Western institutions. German foreign policy-makers are in broad agreement that the two central Western institutions, EU and NATO, need to be reformed for two reasons: they must be able to accept new members without losing efficiency and effectiveness and they must serve as stabilizing factors of a pan-European peace and security system for those countries which do not join. The latter consideration also implies a certain amount of

innovation in those policy areas which have long been served by institutions besides membership in EU and NATO – such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the G7/G8 – or for which there have been institutional mechanisms created in anticipation of EU and NATO expansions – such as the association and partnership agreements of the EU, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the NATO Partnership for Peace.

There is less of a consensus within the Federal Republic and between it and its Western partners on the issue of how to guarantee EU institutional effectiveness and efficiency under changed circumstances than there is on the issue of how to stabilize Eastern Europe. Especially issues regarding the future of European integration clearly evoke stronger public reactions, because there are many societal groups which feel their interests are directly affected by developments. This is not so much the case with NATO expansion. Moreover, the Federal Government is increasingly having to share its competences with a network of other actors whose claims to participate in the formulation of policy are based partly on constitutional law and partly on customary law.<sup>25</sup> Even though support has been declining in recent years there still is considerable agreement on membership in the EU being ‘a good thing’ from which the country benefits and on Germany maintaining its general willingness to transfer national competences to the EU.<sup>26</sup> There is greater controversy, however, as to which material and non-material concessions one should make for projects such as European Monetary Union (EMU) and Eastern enlargement. In addition, it clearly becomes much more difficult to define ‘German’ power in the European context if one considers the disparities of interests – partly due to differences in national self-perceptions of a fundamental nature – both within German society and between Germany and other important EU member states.

If one assumes for reasons of simplification, despite the domestic debates listed above, that there are certain majority views on the most important reforms, three areas can be identified: the pursuit of a robust EMU, Eastern enlargement and – in anticipation thereof – reform of the common agricultural policy, structural policies and EU finances.<sup>27</sup> In each of these areas, Federal Governments past and present have adopted basic positions (with the widespread, if not full, support of the largest respective opposition party) which deviated at times considerably from the policy of other EU member states. Germany manages to find allies for each topic on their reform agenda. There are different perceptions of problems and objectives, often leading to the creation of varying constellations, each with its own integrationist models, power politics and vested interests. German European policy, however, is based on a set of much more clearly formulated preferences than is the case with NATO enlargement. Given the difference in concerns and objectives across the EU and the relative clarity of German preferences with regard to European integration, German European policy often runs up against stronger and at times very diverging forms of opposition. Moreover, domestic concerns in the Federal Republic and scarce resources no longer allow European policy to resort to financial compensation in an effort to overcome such opposition quite so readily.

The comparison between NATO enlargement and EU reform presents a seeming paradox: precisely in those areas where Germany is often seen to have a quasi-hegemonic position there are greater restrictions on its power. To be sure, Germany adheres to an ambitious formative intent, but within the complex network of diverging interests and alternating alliances, it is less and less able to offer those incentives which in the past helped to win over reluctant partners.<sup>28</sup> In such situations, ‘renationalization’ threats could encourage some EU partners to be more

accommodating to German ideas. Yet such threats are not very credible as long as the Germans remain firm advocates of European integration. Moreover, since the Federal Republic would also stand to lose considerably if such threats were carried out, there are serious limits to the use of this power resource. Finally, it is by no means clear whether this resource could be implemented successfully for the pursuit of German objectives, since the threat to do things 'alone and in the traditional fashion'<sup>29</sup> can also be counterproductive.

With this in mind, it would seem that one of the most important resources of German power remains the forging of coalitions with like-minded partners and winning over opponents with 'package deals' which they cannot afford to turn down. Since even Euro-enthusiasts are finding it more and more difficult to justify offers of financial incentives in the face of cross-party appeals to reduce the country's role as a 'net contributor', Germany will unavoidably have to lower its expectations or it will have to become more vigorous when pursuing specifically national objectives. There have been clearer signs of both these tendencies since the end of the Intergovernmental Conference in the summer of 1997.<sup>30</sup> Given the decision-making mechanisms within the EU, there were doubts from the very beginning whether a 'more determined' pursuit of German interests, as called for while the CDU/FDP coalition was still in government, would be successful.<sup>31</sup> As Helmut Kohl's successor, Gerhard Schröder realized this quickly. Though he initially portrayed his predecessor as practising 'chequebook diplomacy' and as being a 'pussyfooter' in European policy, by the time of the Berlin summit of March 1999 he had realized that 'correcting' the imbalances in financial contributions made by individual member states 'self-confidently and with national interests in mind' was easier said than done.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, there have been many times in recent years when Germany's EU

partners quickly resorted to old stereotypes and caricatures of Germans in WWI helmets, even when disagreements were comparatively trivial.<sup>33</sup> Hence, loss of reputation can quickly be more damaging than possible material success.

Compared to the various projects for EU reform, internal reforms of NATO are viewed as less spectacular, despite continuing differences within the Alliance. German foreign policy-makers have kept a lower profile in this area. More importantly, however, there is broader agreement within the Alliance on basic objectives than is the case within the EU. The finer points on strengthening the European contribution to the Alliance and on 'downsizing' command structures continue to arouse controversy, particularly between the United States and France, yet in principle no one questions the general aims or doubts that these reforms must enhance the ability of the Alliance to play a decisive role in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, which also includes non-members.<sup>34</sup> Since these objectives are generally supported domestically, with public opposition difficult to rally, and since – not least due to the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court – a broader public consensus on the requirements for Bundeswehr deployment has developed, the Federal Government can play now a more active role as an equal member in these issues. As with NATO enlargement, the Federal Republic benefits from the fact that it is counted as one of the most important members due to its material resources – despite considerable cutbacks in the defence budget – and that it pursues objectives either for which there is already broad consensus within the Alliance or which can bridge as compromise positions conflicts between other important members.<sup>35</sup>

## Global Challenges

Compared to the analysis of the role of German power in stabilizing its regional environment, a power-political analysis of ‘global challenges’ is easier because relevant problems are more complex and hence, by definition, must be treated without recourse to national perceptions. The long list of these challenges stretches from globalization and fragmentation<sup>36</sup>, environment<sup>37</sup> and development<sup>38</sup>, migration<sup>39</sup> and proliferation<sup>40</sup> to internationally-organized crime and terrorism<sup>41</sup>. These problems have some features in common. Firstly, even the most powerful countries are not in a position to solve them on their own. Secondly, they cannot be addressed at the nation-state level because societal and often transnationally-organized actors play a much greater role than, for example, is the case with European integration.

This is even evident in those areas in which state actors are still best able to argue for providing solutions through international co-ordination. Working within major international institutions concerned with trade, monetary issues and development policy – such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the G7/G8 – the major economic powers still attempt to influence the global economy by selective co-ordination of their policies. Yet how effectively these co-ordination processes can work against the momentum of global markets is becoming more and more uncertain. Even when working in concert with other major countries, a ‘global economic power’ like Germany is less and less able to be successful in its endeavours.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, despite diminishing opportunities for influence, the Federal Republic, alongside the United States and Japan, continues to play a decisive role as a leading global trader with one of the strongest currencies in the world<sup>43</sup>, as far and away the greatest ‘net contributor’ to

the EU<sup>44</sup>, as one of the main contributors to the United Nations (UN) and to its affiliated organizations World Bank and IMF<sup>45</sup>, as one of the most important financial backers of bilateral and multilateral development co-operation<sup>46</sup> and financial transfers to Eastern Europe<sup>47</sup>, which is also taking in a very high number of refugees<sup>48</sup>. All this certainly contributes to Germany being perceived abroad as having become 'more powerful' since unification and regarded by various countries as their 'advocate'. Yet the Federal Republic's power is often over-estimated, since it must be remembered that its activity in many areas is increasingly conducted through the EU and, as such, it is becoming more and more difficult to talk about any 'national' policy in, for example, foreign trade, monetary policy or development aid – or about any 'national' ability to shape events per se.<sup>49</sup> However, this does not mean that German influence is waning. On the contrary, many advocates of a deepening of European integration argue that Europe enables the Federal Republic to increase the sphere of influence of German policy in the face of globalization. If this is to succeed, the Federal Republic will have to be prepared to achieve workable compromises within the EU and perhaps in the bargain even need to lower its sights on given objectives. In all those issues which can only be addressed through institutionalized co-operation at the international level, it remains important that states and their representatives are able to develop consensual or majority-supported solutions. For decades, the Federal Republic's representatives have been 'socialized' in many multilateral and supranational contexts, partly out of necessity and partly by choice. They are certainly no less capable here than the majority of their foreign counterparts.

Multilateral co-ordination alone may not suffice to solve all problems, but it is all the more necessary, in particular for handling precisely those global problems which

cannot be addressed at the national level or which involve certain actors who are determined to undermine state structures. Despite their common aversion to state 'meddling', refugees and finance brokers cannot be denied a certain remaining interest in state or international regulation. This is less true for international arms traffickers, drugs dealers and terrorists, since they do not play by state and international rules. As such, it is hardly surprising that – apart from a few countries whose political elites believe profit can be made from such activities – there is considerable international agreement of a sort which is much wider in this area than is the case with economic issues. Hence there are also fewer differences with respect to problem-identification and objective-setting. Differences tend to arise when discussing ways and means of problem-solving.

As indicated above, a fundamental feature of these global challenges is that individual countries can achieve little on their own. By adopting domestic measures they can at best attempt to minimize the effects of these problems on their own countries. Yet this does nothing to address the sources of problems. International co-ordination is required for countermeasures to be anywhere near effective. Their effectiveness depends on the extent to which the international community presents a united front and includes as early as possible such countries that can credibly impose harsh sanctions on any potential offender. Given its economic might, the Federal Republic certainly belongs to this group of states. Moreover, Germany's instinctive multilateralism may be advantageous here, an approach which is often more successful than attempts to pursue one's own maximum gain, simply because every country needs to keep in mind concerns and sensitivities of others. That said, one considerable contribution which German foreign policy could make would be in



bringing as many countries as possible into the Western fold and introducing them to the practice of multilateral co-ordination.<sup>50</sup>

The Future of German Foreign Policy: Conclusions and Some Advice from Bismarck

If in conclusion we were to return to the tricky question of how 'powerful' Germany is, then it would perhaps be possible to say that 'Germany's power' is considerable under the prevailing conditions. Among these new 'prevailing conditions' is the fact that German foreign policy has become more capable of shaping events, albeit through the European Union, primarily because of changes in the international environment. Some of the restrictions which had limited this capability in the past (such as the division of Germany and the Four Powers' special rights and responsibilities with regard to Berlin and to Germany as a whole) are now gone, and others (such as the possession of weapons of mass destruction by other countries) do not currently pose any direct threat, although they admittedly entail serious risks in the medium term, as recent events in Pakistan and India show. It must also be remembered that under the 'prevailing conditions' the objectives of German foreign policy are not very different from those of its neighbours and important partners and that these objectives meet with general domestic support.

There is at present hardly any area in which German problem-identification significantly differs from that of its major partners (even if we somewhat lower our expectations for the future development of the European Union). At the same time, the domestic discourse on German foreign policy rejects the notion that it would be either advisable or even promising to tackle foreign-policy problems unilaterally. If these assumptions are true, then multilateral co-ordination represents not only an essential prerequisite for the success of foreign policy but also holds the most

promise: it is and remains both necessary and possible for achieving German objectives.

Such a broad domestic consensus on foreign policy is possible at present because there are very few international problems (with the exception of the Kosovo war) which have captured public attention, while pressing domestic problems appear more challenging than ever before. Yet, the belated public debate on EMU does provide some food for thought here. In fact, some of the most important foreign-policy decisions in recent years have been taken without thorough public debate. This criticism is directed not only (and not even primarily) at those who made the decisions (like the Federal Government), but above all at those who failed to make them the subject of public interest (such as the media, the foreign-policy think tanks and academia).<sup>51</sup> This lack of public debate could have dire consequences later, although it need not. At any rate, there is no indication that involving the general public more strongly in the subject would in any way damage German foreign policy. On the contrary, timely and broad debate could possibly minimize long-term negative consequences.

There is a close relationship between material and non-material resources of power, despite their clear differences. Many analyses of power have a tendency to overrate the former and neglect the latter. Particularly in the German case the two are, however, inseparable. Whether the Federal Republic's economic or political weight directly or indirectly influences the achievement of objectives is also dependent on what others perceive to be Germany's true motives. The foreign-policy trust which the Federal Republic has built up over the past forty years and the instinctive multilateralism of German diplomacy are invaluable – and often undervalued – non-material resources. Compared to the more easily measurable and more constant

material resources of power, they are much more diffuse and precarious – not only because they can deteriorate more quickly but also because they cannot be separated from the ever-present historical burdens of the power politics practised by Germany before the founding of the Federal Republic. As such, the advice given by Otto von Bismarck to his successors a century ago is still valid:

‘Once we had created our unity within achievable borders, my ideal objective has always been to ensure that not only the less powerful European states, but also the great powers, are confident that German policy wants to be peace-loving and just, now that the *injuria temporum*, the fragmentation of the nation, has been overcome. In order to foster this trust, the most important things are sincerity, openness and goodwill during times of friction or untoward events. In spite of my personal feelings, I have followed this recipe ... and I believe that there will continue to be occasions to demonstrate that we are contented and peace-loving.’<sup>52</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Christian Hacke, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht wider Willen?* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1997); Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne* (Berlin: Siedler, 1994); William Wallace, 'Deutschland als europäische Führungsmacht,' *Internationale Politik* 50, no. 5 (1995) 23-8; Norbert Kloten, 'Die Bundesrepublik als Weltwirtschaftsmacht,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band I: Grundlagen*, 2nd edn, eds Karl Kaiser and Hanns W Maull (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997) 63-80; Hanns W Maull, 'Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik,' *Europa-Archiv* 47, no. 10 (1992) 269-78; Reinhard Mutz, 'Militärmacht Deutschland? Die Bundeswehr auf der Suche nach ihrer Zukunft,' *Friedensgutachten 1994*, eds Reinhard Mutz et al. (Münster: LIT-Verlag, 1994) 213-28.

<sup>2</sup> See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1995) 1016. For a critical appraisal, see Michael Kreile, 'Verantwortung und Interesse in der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,' *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 5 (26 January 1996) 3-11.

<sup>3</sup> The belief that Germany's relative power position has slightly improved is based on a small increase in the country's share of material power indicators, such as gross national product, exports, currency reserves, military expenditure and troop strength within a group of countries classified as great powers. See Rainer Baumann et al., *Macht und Machtpolitik: Neorealistische Außenpolitiktheorie und Prognosen für die deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung* (Tübingen: Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung 30, 1998) 30-3 and 40-50.

<sup>4</sup> See various contributions in *Internationale Politik* 52, no. 2 (1997).

<sup>5</sup> Space does not allow to go into the various descriptions of German power in any great detail. The present analysis is based on statements of the Federal Government, of governing and opposition parties and – to include the broader public debate – on contributions made by foreign-policy experts. Full references here can be found in Gunther Hellmann, ‘Jenseits von “Normalisierung” und “Militarisierung”’: Zur Standortdebatte über die neue deutsche Außenpolitik,’ *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 1-2 (3 January 1997) 24-33 and in Hellmann, ‘Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany,’ *Mershon International Studies Review* 3, no. 1 (April 1996) 1-39. For an assessment of more recent trends in German foreign policy since the 1998 change in government, see Hellmann, ‘Nationale Normalität als Zukunft? Zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik,’ *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 44, no. 7 (1999) 837-47 and Hellmann, *Beyond ‘Weltpolitik’, Self-Containment and Civilian Power: United Germany’s Normalizing Ambitions* (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, The Birmingham One Europe Series, Discussion Paper 1, 1999).

<sup>6</sup> More recent discussions of power as a concept in international relations, including further references, can be found in David A Baldwin, *Paradoxes of Power* (New York: Blackwell, 1989); Joseph S Nye, Jr, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and William C Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

<sup>7</sup> See Kaiser/Maull, *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik I*; Karl Kaiser and Hanns W Maull (eds), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band II: Herausforderungen* (Munich:

Oldenbourg, 1995); Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause (eds), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band III: Interessen und Strategien* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996).

<sup>8</sup> If, for example, Germany's concerns and objectives were to differ considerably from those of other important actors, it must be assumed – *ceteris paribus* – that the Federal Republic would have to make greater use of its resources in an effort to reach its objectives than would otherwise be the case.

<sup>9</sup> See the contributions by Sebastian Bartsch, Karl Kaiser and Markus Mildenerger, Christian Holst, Frank Brettschneider and Jürgen Hartmann in this volume.

<sup>10</sup> See the contributions by Judith Siwert-Probst, Lisette Andreae and Karl Kaiser, Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, Joachim Krause and Michèle Knodt in this volume.

<sup>11</sup> See Michael Stürmer, 'Deutsche Interessen,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik I* 44-45; Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Das deutsche Dilemma,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik I* 94-7; Helga Haftendorn, 'Gulliver in der Mitte Europas: Internationale Verflechtung und nationale Handlungsmöglichkeiten,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik I* 140-3; Roland Freudenstein, 'Die neuen Demokratien in Ostmitteleuropa und die Europäische Union,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 117-19; Alexander Rahr, 'Rußland in Europa,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 135-6; Steffen Angenendt, 'Migration: Herausforderung deutscher und europäischer Politik,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 180-6; Hans-Georg Wieck, 'Transnationale Gefährdungen der internationalen Sicherheit,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 233-5; Josef Janning, 'Deutschland und die Europäische Union: Integration und Erweiterung,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 34-7; Heinrich Vogel, 'Osteuropa: Ein Schwerpunkt deutscher Außenpolitik,' *Deutschlands neue*

*Außenpolitik III* 169-74; Hans Neusel, 'Internationale Kriminalität,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 265-6.

<sup>12</sup> See Andrei Zagorski, 'Rußlands Erwartungen an Deutschland,' *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 1-2 (3 January 1997) 51-2. Many Central and East European countries also regard the Federal Republic as the 'natural' advocate of their interests. See Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Deutschland: Anwalt Mitteleuropas – Eine polnische Sicht der deutschen Europa-Politik,' *Internationale Politik* 52, no. 2 (1997) 29-33.

<sup>13</sup> For a similar assessment of the significance of multilateralism as a cornerstone of German foreign policy, see Werner Link, 'Die außenpolitische Staatsraison der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,' *Demokratie und Diktatur: Geist und Gestalt politischer Herrschaft in Deutschland und Europa*, eds Manfred Funke et al. (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1987) 400-16; Klaus Dieter Wolf, 'Das neue Deutschland: eine "Weltmacht"?' *Leviathan* 19, no. 2 (1991) 250-3; Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Wandel und Kontinuität der deutschen Außenpolitik,' *125 Jahre Auswärtiges Amt: Festschrift* (Bonn: Auswärtiges Amt, 1995) 21-4. For a thorough treatment of this and similar non-material resources of power, see the discussion on 'soft power' in Nye, *Bound to Lead* 188-201.

<sup>14</sup> The first summit between Boris Yeltsin, Jacques Chirac and Helmut Kohl in Bonn in March 1998 was something entirely new and viewed with great suspicion by Washington and the capitals of smaller European countries. See Christiane Hoffmann, 'Das Treffen im ehemaligen Erholungsheim des sowjetischen Ministerrats umweht ein Hauch des Gestrigen,' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)* (27 March 1998).

<sup>15</sup> See Volker Rühle, 'Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era,' *Survival* 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993) 135. On decision-making processes in Bonn and Washington, see Stephen F Szabo, 'Ein Projekt "Made in Germany": Was Rühes strategischer Logik entsprang, hat die Unterstützung der Regierung Clinton gefunden,' *FAZ* (24 July 1997); Reinhard Wolf, 'The Doubtful Mover: Germany and NATO Expansion,' *Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. David Haglund (Kingston: Queens University, Centre for International Relations, 1996) 197-224; Karl-Heinz Kamp and Peter Weilemann, *Germany and the Enlargement of NATO* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Occasional Papers in European Studies, September 1997); James N Goldgeier, 'NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision,' *The Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1998) 85-102.

<sup>16</sup> See Hellmann, 'Goodbye Bismarck' 5-25 and, especially with regard to Alliance 90/Greens, Eckart Lohse, 'Die Grünen nun auch über Ost-Erweiterung der NATO zerstritten,' *FAZ* (25 March 1998).

<sup>17</sup> See the Bundestag debate pertaining to the ratification of NATO expansion, printed in Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/224 (26 March 1998) and the analysis by Karl Feldmeyer, 'Große Mehrheit im Bundestag für die Ost-Erweiterung der Nato,' *FAZ* (27 March 1998). The distinction between 'including' (meaning full integration in Western institutions) and 'linking' (meaning close co-operation with Western institutions, but without any of the rights afforded to members) is based on an internal strategy paper of the Planning Staff of the Federal Foreign Office. See Claus Gennrich, 'Von Moskau soll es abhängen, ob und inwieweit es sich selbst isoliert,' *FAZ* (8 April 1994).



<sup>18</sup> See also the contribution by Christian Holst in this volume.

<sup>19</sup> The Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research conducted a survey in 1995 on NATO expansion. 33 per cent of those surveyed in West and East Germany agreed in principle to the membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (25 per cent were against and 42 per cent were undecided). Yet these figures were turned on their head when the questioner expressly pointed out that their membership would mean that the Federal Republic would have to defend these countries in the event that they were attacked. When the question was put like that, only 27 per cent were in favour of NATO expansion, while 41 per cent were against and 32 per cent undecided. See Renate Köcher, 'Unerwartete Wende,' *FAZ* (14 June 1995).

<sup>20</sup> See Dominic Lawson, 'Saying the Unsayable about the Germans,' *The Spectator* (14 July 1990) 8-10. See also 'Wer sind die Deutschen?' (Minutes of a meeting between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Germany experts Hugh Trevor Roper, Norman Stone, Timothy Garton Ash, Gordon Craig and Fritz Stern on 24 March 1990), printed in *Der Spiegel*, no. 29 (1990) 109-12. A less trenchant analysis of a supposed 'dramatic reappraisal of German strategic interests', including many voices expressing concerns about German ambitions in its East European 'backyard', can be found in William Drozdiak, 'Eastern Europe Holds New Allure for Germany,' *Washington Post* (21 July 1997).

<sup>21</sup> See the so-called 'Kerneuropa' Paper of CDU MdBs Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers, which was rightly regarded as being very positive about integration but which also contained certain phrases which indirectly threatened that the Federal Republic would unilaterally go its own way, should there be no further European integration. 'Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik: Positionspapier der CDU/CSU-

Bundestagsfraktion vom 1.9.1994,' *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 39, no. 10 (1994) 1271-80.

<sup>22</sup> See Jane Perlez, 'Blunt Reason for Enlarging NATO: Curbs on Germany,' *New York Times* (7 December 1997). On the significance of a country's reputation as a power resource, see also Klaus Knorr, 'National Power in an Economically Interdependent World,' *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems in the Study of International Influence*, eds Kjell Goldmann and Gunnar Sjöstedt (London: SAGE, 1979) 168.

<sup>23</sup> See Vogel, 'Osteuropa: Ein Schwerpunkt deutscher Außenpolitik' 172-3.

<sup>24</sup> Haftendorn, 'Gulliver in der Mitte Europas' 150.

<sup>25</sup> See the contributions by Lisette Andreae and Karl Kaiser, Werner Hoyer, Michèle Knodt and Jürgen Hartmann in this volume. See also Simon Bulmer et al., *Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu*, unpublished manuscript (Munich: Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung, December 1996).

<sup>26</sup> For many years, surveys have been conducted by *Eurobarometer* and others. The results show that the attitudes of the general public are relatively stable. See Hans Rattinger, 'Einstellungen zur europäischen Integration in der Bundesrepublik: Ein Kausalmodell,' *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 3, no. 1 (1996) 45-78. One survey of 475 high-ranking decision-makers shows even clearer support here. 98 per cent of those surveyed regarded membership of the EU as a 'good thing'. In comparison with other countries, German decision-makers are the most supportive. See *Eurobarometer. Top Decision Makers Survey: Summary Report* (September 1996) 4-5.

<sup>27</sup> For the breadth of views, see Janning, 'Deutschland und die Europäische Union' 45-53 and the contributions in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W Maull (eds), *Die Zukunft der europäischen Integration: Folgerungen für die deutsche Politik* (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik 78, 1993). See also Bundestagsfraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Perspektiven für Europa: Materialien zur Integrationsdebatte* (Bonn: lang & schlüssig 13/31, February 1997).

<sup>28</sup> For German viewpoints on the difficult and costly project of EU Eastern enlargement, see the contributions in Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), *Europa öffnen: Anforderungen an die Erweiterung* (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 1997). See also Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, 'Ein Sprung in eiskaltes Wasser: Die EU-Erweiterung ist die größte Herausforderung seit den fünfziger Jahren,' *FAZ* (27 November 1997); Gerhard Konow, 'Die Ost-Erweiterung – nichts als Wunschdenken?' *Frankfurter Rundschau* (12 March 1997).

<sup>29</sup> 'Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik' 1273.

<sup>30</sup> For Germany's net-contributor status, see the various figures in Matthias Kruse, *Die Netto-Beitragsdiskussion in der EU: Zahlen und Hintergründe* (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Arbeitspapier, December 1997) and Peter Hort, 'Waigel besteht auf Entlastung für Deutschland,' *FAZ* (14 October 1997). See also the statement by State Secretary Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz that German European policy will have to become 'more British', in Hort, 'Die deutsche Europapolitik wird "britischer": Bonn stellt das Integrationsmodell in Frage und orientiert sich mehr an Kosten und Nutzen,' *FAZ* (30 October 1997).

<sup>31</sup> See Karl Feldmeyer, 'In der Koalition Streit über die Europa-Politik,' *FAZ* (1 April 1998). This demand corresponds to public attitudes. In a survey conducted by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research in the summer of 1997, 40 per cent of those surveyed stated that one of the most important objectives of foreign policy was 'to pursue primarily Germany's own interests', while only 27 per cent were of the view that the Federal Republic 'should not over-emphasize its economic and political might but rather work harder at adapting to a common Europe'. See Renate Köcher, 'In der Provinz: Das Interesse der Bevölkerung an der Außenpolitik geht rasch zurück,' *FAZ* (10 September 1997). In a survey conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in March 1999, 50 per cent regarded a 'reduction in German contributions' as a 'very important' objective of future European policy. There were only two areas with higher percentages of support: 'common European fight against crime' (70 per cent) and 'ensuring the stability of the Euro' (65 per cent). Only 27 per cent regarded a 'common European constitution' and a mere 10 per cent the 'EU-membership for Central and East European countries' as very important objectives. See Jutta Graf et al., *Die Europäische Union in der öffentlichen Meinung* (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Arbeitspapier, April 1999) 8.

<sup>32</sup> See government policy statement of 10 December 1998, printed in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* 80 (14 December 1998) 967. Euro-scepticism is growing, as evidenced by a large SPD election poster during the June 1999 European Parliament election campaign which depicted Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the slogan 'We don't expect a free lunch from Europe. Nor should Europe expect one from us'.

<sup>33</sup> To cite just a few, see Heinz-Joachim Fischer, ‘Das “Teufelsfüßchen” am Werk: Feindseliges zwischen Italien und Deutschland,’ *FAZ* (13 January 1998); Tobias Piller, ‘Kohl glättet in Rom die antideutschen Wogen,’ *FAZ* (22 January 1998); Ernst Levy, ‘“Deutschland ist kriegssüchtig”: Umfrage bei holländischen Schülern,’ *FAZ* (28 November 1997); Jürg Altwegg, ‘Alte Klischees, neues Ressentiment,’ *FAZ* (25 November 1997); Dirk Schümer, ‘Bitterer Dornröschenkuß: Dänische Ängste vor dem großen Nachbarn im Süden,’ *FAZ* (1 December 1997); Schümer, ‘Römpömpöm genügt nicht: Europa ist Deutschland – Deshalb liebt Dänemark seine Grenze,’ *FAZ* (19 September 1997). For examples during the Schröder Government, see Enrique Báron, ‘Die Neuen nicht zum Sündenbock machen,’ *FAZ* (2 February 1999); Michaela Wiegel, ‘Harte Kritik Chiracs an den deutschen Vorschlägen für das EU-Gipfeltreffen in Berlin,’ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung* (30 May 1999); Michael Stabenow, ‘Der EU-Kompromiß zur Entsorgung von Altautos ist gescheitert: Scharfe Kritik an Deutschland,’ *FAZ* (26 June 1999); Stabenow, ‘Ein häßlicher Ausklang: Stehen Schröder und Fischer in der Kontinuität deutscher Europapolitik?’ *FAZ* (30 June 1999). Only in rather exceptional cases do EU partners tend to react to German presumptions (or rather, what they perceive as presumptions) with subtle irony rather than indignantly. See the Finnish reaction to the idea put forward by the Schröder Government of boycotting the meetings of the Council of Ministers if these were not translated into German in Nikolaus Blome, ‘It is very bedauerlich,’ *Die Welt* (2 July 1999) and ‘Kanzler redet Tacheles, nur in deutsch,’ *tageszeitung* (2 July 1999).

<sup>34</sup> See Joachim Krause, ‘Kooperative Sicherheitspolitik: Strategische Ziele und Interessen,’ *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 77-96.

<sup>35</sup> In addition to the country's geostrategic location, the absolute figures of the German contribution to NATO (defence budget, force levels, contributions to integrated defence, participation in NATO operations, etc.) are decisive here. Interestingly, however, Germany's share of the total expenditure of all NATO countries has been falling constantly in recent years (measured in 1990 prices and exchange rates), in spite of, or perhaps even due to, unification. Germany's share in 1985 was 13.3 per cent (or 35.9 per cent of European members alone). This share crept up to 13.6 per cent (36.7 per cent) by 1990, yet fell to 12.3 per cent (31.8 per cent) by 1995. See the defence budgets of NATO members from 1975-1995 in *NATO-Brief* 44, no. 1 (1996) 31-3.

<sup>36</sup> See Hanns W Maull, 'Internationale Politik zwischen Integration und Zerfall,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 1-22.

<sup>37</sup> See Hans Joachim Schellnhuber and Detlef F Sprinz, 'Umweltkrisen und internationale Sicherheit,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 239-60; Eberhard Feess and Ulrich Steger, 'Umweltpolitik als außenpolitische und globale Gestaltungsaufgabe,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 241-8.

<sup>38</sup> See Gabriele Brenke, 'Entwicklung und Unterentwicklung: Trends und Herausforderungen,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 43-59; Uwe Holtz, 'Entwicklungspolitik: Deutsche Interessen und Strategien,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 221-30.

<sup>39</sup> See Angenendt, 'Migration'; Angenendt, 'Nationale Interessen und außenpolitische Strategien in der deutschen Migrationspolitik,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 231-40.

<sup>40</sup> See Harald Müller, 'Rüstungs- und Zerstörungspotentiale als Herausforderung der internationalen Politik,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 201-23; Erwin Häckel, 'Die Nichtverbreitungspolitik im außenpolitischen Interessengefüge des vereinten Deutschland,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 249-58.

<sup>41</sup> See Wieck, 'Transnationale Gefährdungen der internationalen Sicherheit' and Neusel, 'Internationale Kriminalität'.

<sup>42</sup> This is also evidenced by large corporations increasingly formulating company policy outside the national framework and hence being less and less subject to national controls. See the contribution by Jürgen Hartmann in this volume as well as Wolfgang H Reinicke, 'The Inadequacy of the Nation-State in Managing Current Global Problems,' *Europe, North America, South America: The Nation-State and International Relations After the Cold War. Papers from the 1996 Atlantic Conference*, eds Wolfgang H Reinicke et al. (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1997) 12-17.

<sup>43</sup> See the indices for foreign trade and monetary policy in Kloten, 'Die Bundesrepublik als Weltwirtschaftsmacht'; Reinhard Rode, 'Weltwirtschaft im Umbruch,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik II* 24-32; Joachim Ragnitz, 'Deutschland und die Gestaltung der Weltwirtschaft,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 64-5.

<sup>44</sup> See the references in note 30 and Janning, 'Deutschland und die Europäische Union' 47.

<sup>45</sup> See Christian Tomuschat, 'Deutschland und die Vereinten Nationen,' *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik III* 106. One of the reasons why the Federal Republic is asking for a permanent seat in the Security Council is because it is the third largest contributor to the UN budget, paying more than four of the permanent

members. According to the scale of assessments for 1998 contributions to the regular UN budget, Germany is paying 9.630 per cent, a greater proportion than the contributions paid by the United Kingdom (5.076 per cent), Russia (2.873 per cent) and China (0.901 per cent) put together. See *Vereinte Nationen* 46, no. 1 (1998) 21-4. The German request to become a permanent member, like that of Japan, does not appear controversial for these reasons. See Michael J Inacker, 'Italiens verdeckte Eifersucht: Blockade gegen den deutschen Sitz im UN-Sicherheitsrat,' *Internationale Politik* 52, no. 2 (1997) 59-60. For a discussion on the pros and cons of Germany becoming a permanent member of the Security Council, see Wolfgang Wagner, 'Der ständige Sitz im Sicherheitsrat – Wer braucht wen: Die Deutschen diesen Sitz? Der Sicherheitsrat die Deutschen?' *Europa-Archiv* 48, no. 19 (1993) 533-40; Karl Kaiser, 'Die ständige Mitgliedschaft im Sicherheitsrat: Ein berechtigtes Ziel der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik,' *Europa-Archiv* 48, no. 19 (1993) 541-552; Martin Mogler and Volker Rittberger, 'Reform des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen und ständige Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands,' *Die Reform des UN-Sicherheitsrates: Ein ständiger Sitz für Deutschland?* (Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen, Blaue Reihe 70, 1997) 18-40.

<sup>46</sup> See Holtz, 'Entwicklungspolitik' 223-5; Holtz, 'Entwicklungspolitik: Bilanz und Herausforderungen,' *Weltpolitik im neuen Jahrhundert*, eds Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000) 481-508. Holtz rightly makes reference to the continual reduction in German funding for development co-operation. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Germany's 1999 official development assistance amounted to \$ 5.48 billion. It was far below that of the United States and Japan, comparable to that of



France, and above that of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. See <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/HLM2000stats.htm>> (accessed 30 July 2000).

<sup>47</sup> See Freudenstein, 'Die neuen Demokratien in Ostmitteleuropa und die Europäische Union' 107-10; Vogel, 'Osteuropa: Ein Schwerpunkt deutscher Außenpolitik' 172-3; Jörg Winterberg, *Westliche Unterstützung der Transformationsprozesse in Osteuropa* (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Interne Studien und Berichte 92, 1994) 11-15 and 29-37.

<sup>48</sup> See Angenendt, 'Migration' 175-6 and 181-7; Angenendt, 'Nationale Interessen'. For more recent figures, see 'Millions want to come,' *The Economist* (4 April 1998) 29-30. According to the Council of Europe and the OECD, between 1992 and 1995 Germany had levels of immigration, despite a perceptible reduction, which at times even exceeded those of the United States and were many times those of its European neighbours.

<sup>49</sup> See the contribution by Horst-Dieter Westerhoff in this volume.

<sup>50</sup> See Karl Kaiser, 'Die neue Weltpolitik: Folgerungen für Deutschlands Rolle,' *Weltpolitik im neuen Jahrhundert* 591-605. See also Frank Schimmelfennig, 'Internationale Sozialisation neuer Staaten,' *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 1, no. 2 (1994) 335-55.

<sup>51</sup> See also the introduction by Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, as well as the contribution by Manfred Mols, in this volume.

<sup>52</sup> Otto von Bismarck, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen: Vollständige Ausgabe der Bände 1 und 2 (von 1898) und 3 (von 1919)* (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1929) 544.